I often ask my students why they think the U.S. Supreme Court hands down written opinions. The question traditionally comes on the heels of a maddeningly if unnecessarily complicated opinion, when the justices choose to join parts of a majority opinion but not others, choosing instead to concur in part or in the judgment. Just this past week, for example, during our discussion of
Thornburg v. Gingles, we encountered the following:
BRENNAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, III-B, IV-A, and V, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part IV-B, in which WHITE, J., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. ---. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C.J., and POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. ---. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. --.
In
Gingles, the Court was assigned the task of interpreting the recent Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Setting aside for the moment the question of interpretive philosophy, why did the Court feel compelled to issue an opinion totaling close to 25,000 words, and with so little agreement among the justices? In specific reference to constitutional cases, why doesn’t the Court simply announce its judgment and nothing more, that is, why doesn’t it simply tell us who wins and who loses and save the trouble of writing opinions?
The usual answer is the guidance rationale. That is, the Court writes opinions as a guide to the future, for lower courts, the relevant political actors, and the public at large. But according to Adam Liptak’s
recent piece in the
N.Y. Times, this is no longer a rationale that makes any sense, if it ever did. In Liptak’s words, “In decisions on questions great and small, the court often provides only limited or ambiguous guidance to lower courts. And it increasingly does so at enormous length.”
What, then, to make of the justices’ penchant for expressing themselves? That is, to put the question in a way that actually makes sense: who in the world are the justices’ talking to?